When people selectively forget feedback that threatens the self (mnemic neglect), are those memories permanently lost or potentially recoverable? In two experiments, participants processed feedback pertaining either to themselves or to another person. Feedback consisted of a mixture of positive and negative behaviors exemplifying traits that were both central and peripheral to participants' self-definition. In Experiment 1, participants exhibited poorer recall for, but unimpaired recognition of, self-threatening feedback (i.e., negative, central, selfreferent), relative to both self-affirming feedback (positive, central, self-referent) and otherrelevant feedback (positive/negative, central, other-referent). In Experiment 2, participants who had experienced ego-deflation, but not ego-inflation, exhibited mnemic neglect for recall, but not for recognition. Both experiments imply that, even after being self-protectively neglected, selfthreatening memories can still be retrieved.
central: kind versus cruel; peripheral: modest versus immodest), resulting in four classes of behaviors (i.e., positive central; negative central; positive peripheral; negative peripheral). Some participants are led to believe, or are asked to imagine, that they might personally perform these behaviors. Other participants are led to believe that the behaviors might be performed by another generic person (Chris). This design feature permits a direct comparison of self-referent and otherreferent memory when participants are given a surprise recall task. The typical finding is that participants show poorer recall for self-threatening behaviors (i.e., self-referent negative central) than for either self-affirming (i.e., self-referent positive central) or for other-relevant behaviors (i.e., other-referent positive/negative central). It is this recall disparity between self-affirming and self-threatening behaviors (in the backdrop of other-relevant or tangential behaviors) that we have termed mnemic neglect.
Mnemic neglect has been demonstrated in laboratory contexts high in mundane realism.
For example, in one study (Sedikides & Green, 2000 , Experiment 1), participants received feedback ostensibly from a computer-administered personality test. As a prelude to receiving it, they first answered an array of plausibly-phrased questions from a personality inventory described as valid, reliable, and widely used. Participants then waited for the computer to calculate their results and provide them with their "personality profile," allegedly consisting of behaviors that the participant was "highly likely to perform." In a surprise recall task Mnemic Neglect Model 6 administered after a short break, participants showed selective neglect of self-threatening behaviors relative to affirming behaviors. The same pattern is obtained when participants believe that the source of the feedback is an acquaintance, working with them on a dyadic task (Green, Sedikides, Pinter, & Van Tongeren, 2007) . In addition, however, mnemic neglect occurs even when participants merely imagine receiving feedback (e.g., Sedikides & Green, 2000, Experiment 2). The fact that mnemic neglect occurs under such minimal conditions attests to both the spontaneity and robustness of the effect.
Additional research has revealed mnemic neglect to be strategic: individuals do not indiscriminately neglect all negative self-referent feedback, but only the most threatening feedback. manipulated feedback diagnosticity-the degree to which behaviors define or imply an underlying trait. (Highly diagnostic behaviors alone had been used in all previous experiments.) Behaviors that are both negative and high in diagnosticity are liable to threaten the self, because their unflattering implications would be clear-cut. In contrast, behaviors that are negative but low in diagnosticity are liable not to threaten the self, because their unflattering implications are equivocal. The hypothesis was confirmed: mnemic neglect emerged only for negative feedback that was high as opposed to low in diagnosticity. In a similar vein, Green, Pinter, and Sedikides (2005) manipulated the perceived modifiability of personality traits. They hypothesized that negative feedback about fixed traits would be found threatening but that negative feedback about modifiable traits would not (cf. Roese & Olson, 2007) . They reasoned that, whereas the latter could be understood as a form of constructive advice that facilitates future self-improvement, no such positive construal could be managed of the former. Accordingly, before participants received the standard behavioral feedback, participants were led to believe that the central traits concerned were either modifiable (i.e., flexible, malleable, and inconsistent) or fixed (inflexible, unchangeable, and consistent) across the lifespan. As hypothesized, mnemic neglect emerged for fixed traits only, not for modifiable ones.
As stated above, the mnemic neglect model posits that people are strongly motivated to believe that they are good and to defend this belief. Mnemic neglect, then, serves a selfprotective function. In this regard, it resembles repression (Freud, 1915; Greenwald, 1981; Terr, 1994) , in particular what Erdelyi (2006) has recently termed inhibitory repression. This involves "cognitive avoidance (non-thinking) of some target material [that] leads to loss of accessible memory" (p. 499). The concept of inhibitory repression is rooted not only in Ebbinghaus' (1885) work, showing that the simple exclusion of stimuli from consciousness leads to forgetting, but also in contemporary work, demonstrating that forgetting can be intentionally induced (explanations for which include retrieval inhibition, selective search, and selective rehearsal: Anderson, 2001; Anderson & Green, 2001; Bjork, 1989; Geiselman, Bjork, & Fishman, 1983; Levy & Anderson, 2002; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Ford, 1997; Roediger & Crowder, 1972) . Indeed, inhibitory control is more successful for negative than neutral memories (Depue, Banich, & Curran, 2006) . From this perspective, then, the neglect of self-threatening feedback is one species of inhibitory repression (Sedikides & Green, 2006) . But what exactly does shallow processing, cognitive avoidance, inhibitory repression, or mnemic neglect involve? That is, how do individual allocate processing resources to threatening self-referent information? To address this question, we (Green, Pinter, & Sedikides, 2007) carried out an experiment in which we directly manipulated type of processing for self-referent feedback. Participants were instructed to consider why some behaviors described them (integration judgments) and why other behaviors did not (separation judgments). Integration judgments led to better recall, whereas separation judgments led to poorer recall. This pattern of results suggests a possible mechanism for mnemic neglect. If information is self-affirming, then it is integrated with or connected to stored self-knowledge. In contrast, if the information is selfthreatening, then it is separated or disconnected from stored self-knowledge.
Also relevant here is a key experiment in which we manipulated the time available for participants to process behavioral feedback (Sedikides & Green, 2000, Experiment 3) . Half the participants had ample time (8 seconds) to read each individual behavior (presented one by one, at random, via computer), whereas the other half had only limited processing time (2 seconds). It transpired that mnemic neglect emerged in the ample time condition, but not in the limited time condition. To be specific, when reading time was ample, recall for all classes of behaviors was relatively better, except for behaviors that threatened the self, namely those that provided negative central self-referent feedback. Evidently, participants selectively inhibited thinking about self-threatening feedback relative to self-affirming feedback other-relevant feedback, and tangential feedback. Thus, the pattern is consistent with the possibility that people make separation judgments when confronted with self-threatening information, but integration judgments when confronted with self-affirming (and perhaps other) information (Green et al., 2007) .
The Mystery of Neglected Memories
One key and unresolved issue for our model is this: What happens to the neglected memories? Is self-threatening information permanently lost? Or are stored traces of that information still available for subsequent recovery?
One theoretical and empirical perspective suggests that, once forgotten, memoriesincluding self-threatening ones-are well and truly gone: memory decay implies permanent loss (Ganaway, 1989; Holmes, 1990; Loftus, 1993; see Loftus & Davis, 2006 , for a recent review).
This view, however, can be challenged on two grounds (at least in the case of non-traumatic memories; Erdelyi, 2006) . First, many "lost" memories can be recovered simply with retrieval effort (Erdelyi, 1996; Payne, 1987; Roediger & Thorpe, 1978) . Second, memories can be recovered through routes other than recall. Indeed, recovery through such alternative routes is what defines implicit, procedural, and recognition memory (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Nobel & Shiffrin, 2001; Rovee-Collier, Hayne, & Colombo, 2000) . Ultimately, the empirical observation that seemingly absent memories can still be subtly present led to postulation of multiple memory systems (Roediger, Marsh, & Lee, 2002; Roediger, Rajaram, & Geraci, in press; Tulving, 1987) .
The distinction between recall and recognition is of particular relevance to the present research. Compared to recall measures, recognition measures are generally regarded as more sensitive tools for memory recovery (Anderson & Bower, 1972; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997; Srull, 1984) . The person memory literature also furnishes some relevant evidence. Two meta-analyses found an overall advantage in recall for behaviors inconsistent (as opposed to consistent) with prior impressions (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992) , though recognition results differed. Note how this effect would tend to inhibit the emergence of mnemic neglect, given that self-threatening feedback is inconsistent with the normative positivity of the selfconcept. The fact that mnemic neglect emerges nonetheless underscores the robustness of the phenomenon.
Hypotheses
The autobiographical memory literature has established that negative information is generally remembered more poorly than positive information (positivity bias: Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004; Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, & Shannon, 1991; Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003) . The mnemic neglect model additionally states that this pattern is exacerbated for negative information about important traits that one possesses. So far, however, research on both autobiographical memory and mnemic neglect has employed measures of recall. However, given that (a) memories that have been seemingly forgotten can be subsequently retrieved, (b) recognition is more sensitive to such memories than recall, and (c) discrepant findings for measures of recall and recognition have already emerged in the person memory literature, we hypothesized that self-threatening information, even when it becomes inaccessible to recall, will nonetheless remain accessible to recognition. Hence, we predicted that mnemic neglect would emerge on measures of recall but not on measures of recognition.
To be sure, the recognition of self-threatening information, like the recall thereof, relies partly on explicit recollections of previously encountered material. However, unlike recall, recognition also capitalizes upon feelings of familiarity. It is the latter retrieval route-which does not require the detailed traversal of the associative pathways formed during processing (Diana, Reder, Arndt, & Heekyeyong, 2006; McElree, Dolan, & Jacoby, 1999; Yonelinas, 2002 )-that we expected to negate the usual mnemic neglect effect, by permitting access to less well-elaborated (i.e., self-protectively inhibited) memory traces.
Overview
We report two experiments. All participants (a) were introductory psychology students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH), (b) attended in groups of up to seven persons, (c) sat in visually isolated cubicles, and (d) were debriefed upon finishing. In both experiments, participants completed surprise measures of recall and recognition after having received mixed feedback in the form of 32 behaviors that either they or another person would be hypothetically likely to perform. Experiment 2 also featured an additional manipulation of threat sensitivity. Between-subject cell sizes were roughly equivalent.
EXPERIMENT 1 Method

Validation of Stimulus Behaviors
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Past research (Sedikides, 1993 (Sedikides, , 1995 Sedikides & Green, 2000) had established that university (including UNC-CH) students regard the traits trustworthy and kind as central but the traits modest and uncomplaining as peripheral. In the present experiment, each of these four traits was exemplified by eight behaviors (four positive, and four negative)-the same 32 behaviors employed by Sedikides and Green (2000; Experiments 1-3) . These exemplars had already been pilot-tested (see Sedikides & Green, 2000) to ensure that they were (a) highly positive or negative, (b) highly important to perform or not to perform, and (c) highly diagnostic of intended traits (i.e., the behavior is informative regarding whether or not the individual is described by the underlying trait).
Thus, an extra set of 32 behaviors exemplifying the same traits was required to serve as control or lure behaviors for the recognition task. This new set was derived from two sources: 16 central behaviors used in a previous experiment (Sedikides & Green, 2000 , Experiment 4); and 16 newly-constructed peripheral behaviors. Care was taken so that the new behaviors were as similar as possible to the old ones. The Appendix contains the complete list of 64 behaviors.
Participants and Experimental Design
One hundred and seventy-eight participants were randomly assigned to between-subjects conditions. Data were discarded from seven participants who misunderstood the recall instructions and recorded trait words rather than behaviors, and from two participants who wrote more than three intrusions (e.g., writing down a behavior that was not presented). The Participants read through the packet of behaviors at their own pace for about 5 minutes and then engaged in a distractor task for 2.5 minutes. Next, the packet of behaviors was replaced by a booklet of blank slips of paper. Participants were instructed to generate as many behaviors as they could remember in any order that the behaviors came to mind (recall task). In addition, they were asked (a) to write only one behavior per page, (b) not to turn back to previous pages, and (c) to attempt to be accurate without worrying about recalling the behaviors verbatim.
Participants then engaged in a recognition accuracy task administered on IBM PCs. The first computer screen contained the following instructions: "Now we are going to present several behaviors to you. Some of these you read before in the booklet, but some are new-you haven't seen them before. We would like you to identify the old sentences and the new sentences. If the sentence is old (i.e., you read it before), then press the 'z' key, but if the sentence is new (i.e., you have not read it before), then press the '/' key." Participants were instructed to rest their fingers on the two keys. The 64 behaviors were presented in the middle of the computer screen in random order.
Results and Discussion
Data Reduction
Recall. Written responses were coded according to a gist criterion (Srull, 1981; Srull & Brand, 1983) : behaviors were counted as correctly recalled if the text conveyed the general meaning of the behavior. Intrusions (i.e., writing the same behavior twice, recalling a behavior that was not presented, changing the valence of a recalled behavior) were removed prior to data analysis. Intrusion rates were low (4.1% of recalled items) and comparable to the low intrusion rates reported in other experiments using a similar methodology (Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987; Wyer, Bodenhausen, Srull, 1984; Sedikides & Green, 2000 . The proportion of behaviors correctly recalled served as the dependent index.
Recognition. Recognition responses-having been derived from a yes-no recognition task in which participants indicated whether each behavior was "old" (previously seen) or "new" (never seen before)-were analyzed using signal detection theory (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999; Swets, 1996) . Briefly, the theory assumes that participants seek to identify a signal (i.e., an "old" item) against a background of noise (i.e., a "new" item). Doing so is an inherently probabilistic and error-prone task. Accordingly, two normal curves of equal variance are used to model respondents' judgments of signal and noise respectively. For yes-no recognition tests, one curve represents participants' judgments about old items (the "signal"), and the other curve their judgments about new items (the "noise"). Participants distinguish between old and new items on the basis of some decision criterion, answering "old" above it and "new" below it. Four types of answer are possible: an old item can be correctly identified as old (a hit); a new item can be correctly identified as new (a correct rejection); an old item can be mistakenly classified as new (a miss); and a new item can be mistakenly identified as old (a false alarm).
Accuracy of discrimination (or sensitivity) is typically quantified by d', the normalized hit rate minus the normalized false alarm rate. This index, which varies from 0 (no discrimination) to ∞ (perfect discrimination), corresponds to the displacement of the two normal curves. It has the virtue of being uninfluenced by response bias. Response bias itself can be quantified by c, the average of the normalized hit rate and the normalized false alarm rate.
2 This index, which varies from -∞ (always saying "new") to +∞ (always saying "old"), corresponds to the displacement of the criterion from the neutral decision point between the curves. Both d' and c served as dependent indices. In addition, we also analyzed recognition accuracy using a non-normalized index δ-equal to half the proportion of hits plus half the proportion of correct rejectionsbecause of its greater immediate intelligibility and comparability to the recall index (i.e., proportion correct).
Recall and Recognition Accuracy
Although results from recall and recognition measures are typically analyzed separately, our hypotheses required an explicit test for whether they converged or diverged. Consequently,
we conducted a preliminary analysis that included Memory Test Type (Recall vs. Recognition) as an additional within-subjects factor. In particular, we conducted a 2 (Behavior Set) x 2 (Referent:
Self vs. Chris) x 2 (Behavior Valence) x 2 (Behavior Type: Central vs. Peripheral) x 2 (Memory Test Type: Recall vs. Recognition) mixed-subjects ANOVA, with repeated measures on the final three factors. The accuracy index for recall was proportion correct, while that for recognition was δ.
We hypothesized that mnemic neglect would compromise the recall, but not the recognition, of self-threatening feedback. Hence, we predicted that the three-way Referent x
Behavior Type x Behavior Valence interaction that diagnoses mnemic neglect would be present for recall but absent for recognition. If so, then a critical four-way interaction involving these three factors and Memory Test Type should emerge. It did, F(1, 146) = 9.65, p < .002. We report subsequent analyses for recall and recognition separately below.
Recall
The data from 169 participants were entered into a 2 (Behavior Set) x 2 (Referent) x 2 (Behavior Valence) x 2 (Behavior Type) mixed-subjects ANOVA, with the last two variables as within-subjects factors. This suggests a general encoding advantage for consequential unflattering material. However, no self-related motivation is implicated, and the Referent factor is uninvolved.
Bias. We used the index c to quantify participants' propensity to judge behaviors as previously seen or previously unseen. Participants were more cautious about claiming to recognize central behaviors than peripheral ones, F(1, 146) = 4.51, p < .05. They were also more cautious about claiming to recognize negative behaviors than positive ones, F(1, 146) = 11.32, p < .0001, an effect that was stronger for peripheral than for central behaviors, F(1, 146) = 6.55, p < .02. However, no simple or interactive effects involving the Referent factor emerged.
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Nonetheless, if one compares Self and Chris participants directly within each cell defined by the Behavior Type by Behavior Valence interaction, one finds that the former were significantly less ready than the latter to claim to recognize central negative behaviors, F(1, 160) = 5.48, p < .02, but not to claim to recognize central positive ones (F < 1), peripheral positive ones (F < 1), or peripheral negative ones, (F = 1.76, p = .18). Greater reluctance to recognize negative central behaviors, when ascribed to oneself as opposed to another, suggests yet another attempt to self-protect.
Summary
As hypothesized, mnemic neglect emerged on a measure of recall: participants forgot feedback more when it was self-threatening than when it was self-affirming or other-relevant.
This oft-obtained pattern, however, did not emerge on a measure of recognition: accurate discrimination of old and new items was unaffected by self-threat. These discrepant results for different memory measures are consistent with self-threatening information being encoded into memory but being thereafter less accessible to recall than to recognition. Unflattering material, though clearly forgotten, is not entirely gone.
EXPERIMENT 2
Our prior research has established that self-threat drives the mnemic neglect effect Green et al., 2005; Sedikides & Green, 2000; . In that research, however-as in the current Experiment 1-the self-threat has been presented in isolation, devoid of context. In contrast, threatening feedback in everyday life is typically provided against a backdrop of additional feedback. Moreover, the earlier feedback will, in many cases, already have exerted a psychological effect, either by diminishing people's self-esteem In Experiment 2, we simulated the ongoing nature of feedback in daily life. In particular,
we had participants initially receive either critical or flattering feedback from one type of source, followed by the usual mixed behavioral information from a different source. The feedback from the first source, designed to induce initial ego deflation or inflation, stemmed from an assessment of cognitive abilities (i.e., a creativity test). The feedback from the second source, designed to induce subsequent mnemic neglect, stemmed from the way familiar others ostensibly perceived one's important social qualities (e.g., trustworthiness, kindness), as in Experiment 1. The idea that one round of feedback can influence how another round is received finds fertile ground in Tesser's (2000) substitution principle. According to this principle, psychological resources are interchangeable in the self-system. This implies that the impact of sequential emotional experiences should be transferable.
We will now state our hypotheses formally. For recall, we hypothesized that mnemic neglect would once again be observed. Moreover, we hypothesized that it would be more pronounced following ego-deflation than following ego-inflation. Shaken by a self-diminishing experience, ego-deflated participants would shy away from self-threatening feedback and be more attuned to self-affirming feedback (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993; Campbell, Baumeister, Dhavale, & Tice, 2003; Stapel & Schwinghammer, 2004 rehearsing and recalling self-affirming feedback. Hence, we hypothesized that recall of selfaffirming feedback would exceed recall of self-threatening information in the ego-deflation condition but not in the ego-inflation condition. We also hypothesized that recall of otherreferent and tangential feedback would be unaffected by the prior feedback manipulation.
In contrast, we hypothesized no corresponding pattern of results for recognition. Informed by past literature (Erdelyi, 2006) , and by the findings of Experiment 1, we hypothesized that memories of self-threatening behaviors would be recovered as successfully as memories of other types of behaviors (self-affirming, other-relevant, or tangential), whether they were preceded by ego-deflation or by ego-inflation. In short, we hypothesized that mnemic neglect would simply not emerge on measures of recognition.
Method
Participants and Experimental Design
Two hundred and thirty-two participants were randomly assigned to between-subjects conditions. Data from 11 participants were excluded: three exhibited more than three intrusions, and eight misunderstood recall instructions. The design was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the addition of the extra between-subjects factor Manipulation Type (Ego-Deflation vs.
Ego-Inflation).
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the crucial addition of a between-subject manipulation involving ego-deflation or ego-inflation prior to presenting the set of self-referent or other-referent behaviors. Participants began by engaging in an ostensible creativity task, dubbed the "Lange-Elliot Creativity Test." This bogus test has been used successfully elsewhere to provide participants with false feedback (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999; Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998) . After rating the personal importance of the trait "creativity" on an 11-point scale (1 = not at all important; 11 = extremely important), participants spent 5 minutes generating various functional uses for a brick and a candle. Their answers were collected and ostensibly graded, while they performed an unrelated distractor task (i.e., drawing a map of the campus) for approximately 6 minutes. The feedback indicated participants' relative position on a histogram describing a large sample of UNC-CH students who had already taken the test. Participants learned either that they had performed poorly, ranking in the 31 st percentile (Ego-Deflation), or that they had performed well, ranking in the 93 rd percentile (Ego-Inflation). To reinforce the point, arrows pointed to relevant percentiles. Participants then confirmed that they understood the feedback by initialing a line below.
Participants then answered three manipulation-check questions about how they perceived the manipulation, and three further questions about their mood. First, they indicated, on 11-point scales, (a) the extent to which they believed that they had succeeded or failed at the creativity task, (b) how pleased they were with their performance, and (c) how positive or negative they regarded the feedback as being. Next, they rated, also on 11-point scales, how they felt at that moment (good-bad; happy-sad; pleasant-unpleasant) .
Following the manipulation, participants proceeded to the "impression" task. As in Experiment 1, they read a description of a person (either themselves or Chris) consisting of 32
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single-sentence behaviors in a booklet. Having done so, they engaged in the distractor task for 2.5 min, followed by the surprise recall task. Finally, the 32 previously seen behaviors, and a control set of 32 behaviors, were presented on the computer screen, one by one in a random order.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check
We computed composite scores for both the manipulation-perception questions (α = .79) and the mood questions (α = .93). Participants reported more positive perceptions following egoinflation (M = 8.56) than ego-deflation (M = 6.89), t(221) = 6.44, p < .001. In addition, participants were in a better mood following ego-inflation (M = 8.56) than ego-deflation (M = 6.89), t(221) = 6.44, p < .0001. We therefore deemed our manipulation successful.
Data Reduction
Recall and recognition data were coded and quantified as in Experiment 1. For recall, intrusion rates were again low (4.1% of recalled items).
Analytic Strategy
We predicted a significant five-way interaction involving Referent, Behavior Type, Thus, our sequence of a priori predictions for recall was perfectly borne out. Mnemic neglect emerged reliably following ego-deflation but not following ego-inflation. However, inspection of the means in Table 3 reveals that recall of self-threatening (central negative)
behaviors did not differ significantly between the ego-inflation and ego-deflation conditions, see also Sherman & Cohen, 2006) , we suggest that there is a dynamic relationship between selfaffirming and self-threatening information, such that elaborative processes for the former behaviors will be stronger after a previous ego-deflation, but weaker after a previous egoinflation. That is, when an individual feels affirmed, the motive to protect the self by selectively recalling more self-affirming than self-threatening information should be muted, whereas, when an individual feels threatened, the motive to protect the self should come to the fore, leading to increased recall for self-affirming versus self-threatening information.
In order to further explore this interpretation, we examined the internal correlations between reactions to the creativity test feedback and recall. We analyzed the ego-deflation and ego-inflation conditions separately for participants who processed the information selfreferentially. In the ego-inflation condition, the correlation between reaction to the feedback and recall for self-threatening behaviors was significant: the more positively they responded to the ego-inflation feedback, the more they recalled negative central behaviors, r(53) = .33, p < .02.
This finding is consistent with theory and results of self-affirmation theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) . In the ego-deflation condition, the correlation between response to feedback and recall for self-affirming (positive central) behaviors was marginal, r(55) = -.26, p < .06. That is, the more negatively they reacted to the ego-deflation feedback, the more they recalled positive central behaviors. This correlation appears to support our contention that individuals may respond to threat by bolstering their self-views via selective recall of affirming information. No other correlations between reactions to feedback and any recall or recognition indices attained significance.
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Recognition Accuracy. As in Experiment 1, two indices of recognition accuracy were used, δ and d'.
Means for 225 participants 6 , expressed as δ, are displayed in Table 4 .
As predicted, no four-way interaction emerged between Referent, Behavior Valence, 
Ruling Out Mood as an Explanation for the Recall Results
As previously mentioned, participants in the ego-inflation condition reported a more positive mood than those in the ego-deflation condition. However, when mood was entered as a covariate, none of the recall effects changed significantly. Thus, we can rule out mood as an explanation for the divergent recall findings between the ego-inflation and ego-deflation conditions. These findings echo the results of related research, in which mood fails to moderate the effects of negative feedback (e.g., social exclusion; Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005) .
Summary
Results were again consistent with the hypotheses. For recall, mnemic neglect was significantly moderated by the recent experience of ego-deflation or ego-inflation, emerging reliably after the former but vanishing after the latter. For recognition, mnemic neglect failed to emerge in either case. Thus, Experiment 2 again found both that self-protection prompts the neglect of central negative feedback, but that such neglect is not the result of offending memories being eliminated. Rather, their latent traces can be unearthed through recognition.
General Discussion
In a previous part of this program of research Green et al., 2005; Sedikides & Green, 2000 , we simulated, in the experimental laboratory, social situations in which people receive mixed social feedback. In particular, participants received real or imagined feedback from familiar others (e.g., friends, employers, partners), consisting of both positive and negative elements, and referring both to central and peripheral aspects of personality. We repeatedly found that people showed selectively poorer recall for self-threatening feedback (i.e., negative in implication, and pertaining to central aspects of personality) compared to self-affirming (i.e., positive central) or other-relevant feedback. We labeled this phenomenon mnemic neglect, and characterized it as a species of self-protection . In this article, we addressed an important unresolved question arising out of this research: Are the forgotten memories of self-threatening feedback permanently lost or potentially recoverable?
Evidence exists that many memories which cannot be initially recalled can nonetheless be subsequently recovered, either with retrieval effort (Payne, 1987; Roediger & Thorpe, 1978) or through recognition (Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997; Wyer et al., 1984) . Given that forgotten memories can nonetheless persist, and that recognition measures can be sensitive to their presence, we hypothesized that mnemic neglect would be present on measures of recall (replicating past research) but absent from measures of recognition. The results of Experiment 1 duly confirmed these hypotheses.
In Experiment 2, we proceeded to investigate a potential moderator of mnemic neglect, again using parallel measures of recall and recognition. In Experiment 1, and our own past research (e.g., , the mixed feedback was a once-off affair. However, in the real world, different waves of feedback often follow in swift succession, with one wave being psychologically processed in the context of another. Consequently, we wondered, how would the prior receipt of favorable or unfavorable feedback, leading to either ego-inflating or egodeflation, affect the magnitude of the mnemic neglect effect? We hypothesized that, whereas ego-inflation would undermine mnemic neglect by affirming and shielding the self-system (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Trope & Neter, 1994) , ego-deflation would promote it by fostering additional self-protective motivation (Campbell et al., 2003; Stapel & Schwinghammer, 2004) . In addition, we hypothesized that these dynamics-which would again underscore the motivational nature of mnemic neglect-would only be apparent on measures of recall, not on measures of recognition. The results of Experiment 2 confirmed these hypotheses.
The mnemic neglect model may help to explain the cognitive underpinnings of other established effects, such as the positivity bias in autobiographical memory (Walker et al., 2003) , positive illusions about the self (Taylor & Brown, 1988) , and the self-serving attributional bias (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004) . If one is especially prone to forget negative details about oneself on topics of consequences, then it is easy to see why one's life might appear rosy in retrospect, why one might remember only the positive points of one's personality, or why one might remember only one's own contributions to one's success. At the same time, the recall versus recognition findings we report may also help resolve the paradox of why such robust selfenhancing biases exist despite the fact that negative information generally garners greater attention (Fiske, 1980; Pratto & John, 1991) and is generally accorded greater weight (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001 ). We suggest a resolution along the lines of Taylor's (1991) mobilization-minimization hypothesis, according to which a negative event (e.g., self-threatening feedback) initially elicits a vigorous, rapid, and direct response (e.g., reacting strongly against criticism), followed by a more measured, prolonged, and indirect response (e.g.,
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not thinking about it). The former, mobilization, seeks to undo or contain the negative event, whereas the latter, minimization, seeks to dampen or erase its impact. When it comes to negative feedback, we suspect that people firstly mobilize by challenging and counterarguing its implications (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Edwards & Smith, 1996) but secondarily minimize by distancing themselves from it (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995) or not thinking about it (Erdelyi, 2006) . We submit that mnemic neglect, and many other biases in favor of self, occur at the minimization stage, whereas negativity biases occur at the mobilization stage.
This resolution also suggests that using different memory strategies (e.g., recognition), or inducing individuals to actively reflect on negative information, may reduce self-related biases to which mnemic neglect contributes. In keeping with this suggestion, Sedikides, Horton, and Gregg (2007) reported that participants who reflected on why they might or might not possess negative central traits (e.g., untrustworthy, unkind, unfriendly) rated themselves more unfavorably on those traits than control participants did.
Stereotyping research (von Hippel, Jonides, Hilton, & Narayan, 1993; Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, & Frost, 1998) suggests that stereotypes facilitate quick and efficient coding of consistent items (i.e., good conceptual processing) relative to inconsistent items, but that less attention is paid to the details of the stimulus (i.e., poor perceptual processing). This system is flexible and efficient, and one implication of this model is that under cognitive load, more processing resources are allocated to inconsistent items (i.e., longer attention and better perceptual encoding), although conceptual processing of consistent items is still superior (Sherman et al., 1998) . Might these processing styles have some bearing on the processing of self-threatening and self-affirming information? We are skeptical for two reasons. First we have found that reading time for self-threatening and self-affirming information does not significantly differ (Green & Sedikides, 2007) . Second, recognition of self-threatening (inconsistent) information in the present experiments was not higher than recognition of self-affirming (consistent) information. However, future research could more directly test this proposition by manipulating cognitive load, assessing reading time, and measuring both conceptual and perceptual processing (e.g., by providing a richer stimulus set and assessing how well perceptual details are recalled), or by directly pitting processing of threatening and affirming information against each other (Sherman et al., 1998) . In addition, a "think aloud" protocol might shed light on the type of encoding as well as further empirically examine the integration and separation judgments that we have proposed. In conclusion, our research showed that self-threatening memories are accessible and recoverable in normal adults. Our findings complement relevant literature in clinical psychology (Erdelyi, 2006) , and take a step toward bridging the theoretical and methodological gap between the self-perceptions and person-perception literatures. Empirical inquiry into the cognitive mechanisms underlying the processing of self-threatening information evidently has a promising feature. patterns: the first, presented to half the participants, started with a negative and ended with a positive behavior; the second, presented to the remaining half, started with a positive and ended with a negative behavior (being the mirror image of the first). Also counterbalanced was the order in which central and peripheral behaviors appeared (Behavior Type Order). Half the participants read the central behaviors first, and half read the peripheral behaviors first. In the data analysis of both experiments, these two between-subjects order variables were included in the model, but are not included in the model description for the sake of presentation clarity. No substantive effects involving either order variable emerged, rendering our decision to omit them from the model description easier.
2 Traditionally, response bias in signal detection paradigms has been quantified by (the natural logarithm of) β, which represents the ratio of the heights of the signal and noise distributions at the decision criterion (McNicol, 1972, pp. 62-63) . However, it may be less plausible to assume that respondents base their decisions on a likelihood ratio than on the actual position of decision criterion (Richardson, 1994) . In addition, c has two advantages over log β: it is unaffected by changes in d' (McNicol, 1972, pp. 63-64) and it is computationally simpler. We express c such that positive values indicate a bias towards detecting a signal (i.e., an "old" item; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) . In cases where the proportions on which c is based equal unity or zero, a value of .5 ÷ k, where k is number of signal or noise trials, can be subtracted or added to facilitate computation (similarly for d ' ; McMillan & Kaplan, 1985) .
